Allah has set a seal on their hearts and on their hearing. And on their eyes is a veil; and great is the penalty they incur. (Khatama Allah ‘alā qulūbihim wa ‘alā sam‘ihim, wa ‘alā abṣārihim ghishāwa wa la‑hum ‘adhābun ‘aẓīm.)
Introduction
Consider this: At this point we have to stop to listen to what the scholars of kalām have to say, for a fierce war has been waged around this verse, between the Mu‘tazila, the Jabriyya, and the Sunnis. Wars like this have caught the attention of observers. It is appropriate therefore to mention the main arguments so they may be benefited from.
[It will be seen then that] the Sunni School is the Straight Path, and the others either go to excess or are deficient.
The First:
It has been established that “there is no effective agent in the universe other than Allah the Most High.” Hence, there is no delegation of power, [as the Mu‘tazila asserted, that man creates his own actions].
The Second:
“Allah is All‑Wise,” so reward and punishment are not futile or without wisdom. Hence, there is no compulsion.
The Third:
Everything has two aspects: the outer (mulkiyya) aspect, which is sometimes good and sometimes bad.
Different forms intrude on it in succession, like the back of a mirror.
The inner aspect (malakūtiyya) looks to the Creator. It is transparent in every respect, like the front of a mirror. Thus, the creation of bad is not bad, because its creation in respect of the inner face is good. The creation of bad is to complete the good, so is indirectly good. So pay no attention to the specious arguments of the Mu‘tazila!
The Fourth:
The al‑ḥāṣil bi’l-maṣdar is the outcome of the verbal noun (maṣdar), like death is the outcome (al‑ḥāṣil bi’l-maṣdar) of murder (qatl – verbal noun) and pain is the outcome (al‑ḥāṣil bi’l-maṣdar) of a blow (ḍarb – verbal noun). The outcome of the verbal noun is something fixed, created, and lifeless, and attributes cannot be derived from it. [That is, the active particle cannot be derived from something lifeless (jāmid), as is well known in grammar (‘ilm al‑ṣarf.] The verbal noun (al‑maṣdar), however, is acquired (maksūb), relative (nisbī), and hypothetical (i‘tibārī) and attributes can be derived from it. Thus, the Creator of murder (qatl) cannot be the murderer (qātil). So leave the Mu‘tazila to plunge in vain discourse and trifling.(See, 6:91)
The Fifth:
Apparent actions are generally the result of a succession of acts that end in a person’s ‘inclination’ (mayalān), called will (al‑juz’ al-ikhtiyārī). It is around this point that the arguments have revolved.
The Sixth:
It is the Most High’s practice that His universal will looks to the particular will of His servant, [That is, it is manifested in accordance with the servant’s will] so there is no compulsion.
The Seventh:
Knowledge is dependent on the thing known; the thing known is not dependent on knowledge, otherwise it would be a circular argument. So a person cannot make excuses concerning, [or disclaim responsibility for], his actions by ascribing their magnitude and measure to divine determining (qadar) [by claiming they are determined].
The Eighth:
The creation of the ḥāṣil bi’l‑maṣdar is dependent on the ‘acquisition’ of the verbal noun (maṣdar) through the functioning of the divine laws in the universe (‘ādāt Allāh ta‘āla) in accordance with the conditions He has laid down for them. And the nucleus and life force in the acquisition of the verbal noun is inclination (mayalān), and when this is solved, the nub of the question is solved.
The Ninth:
Preference [something being preferable] without a cause or attribute to cause it is impossible, but choice without a cause or attribute to cause it is not impossible. Thus, no aim (gharaḍ) or cause (‘illa) is necessary in Allah’s actions; the only agent of choice (murajjiḥ) is His will.
The Tenth:
An existent matter must necessarily have an effective agent (mu’aththir) [to bring it into existence], otherwise preference without a cause or attribute to cause it would be necessary, and this is impossible as shown above. However, a theoretical matter (i‘tibārī) [like human will and inclination] can be specified (takhaṣṣuṣ) without a specifier (mukhaṣṣiṣ); this is not necessarily impossible. [That is, since man’s inclinations do not have external existence, they do not require a cause.]
The Eleventh:
A being has to be necessary for it to come in to existence; that is, a thing cannot come into existence if its existence is not necessary; its existence becomes necessary only on the conjunction of two wills, universal will and particular will; it then has existence instantaneously.
The Twelfth:
The knowledge that a thing exists does not necessitate knowing its nature; and the absence of such knowledge does not necessitate its non‑existence. So the inability to define the true nature of will does not contradict its certain existence.
If you have comprehended these principles, listen now to what shall be said:
We Sunnis say: O Mu‘tazila! The bondsman [of Allah] is not creator of the ḥāṣil bi’l‑maṣdar; that is, the results of his actions. He is only the masdar or source of his actions. For “there is no effective agent in existence other than Allah.” Divine unity (tawḥīd) necessitates this.
Now we say to the Jabriyya: man is not under compulsion for he has (particular) will (juz’ ikhtiyārī), for Allah is All‑Wise. Moreover, Allah’s being exempt from all defect necessitates it.
If You Were to Ask: Whenever man’s will is dissected, the only thing to appear is predestination (al‑jabr)?
You Would Be Told: Firstly: The conscience and innate disposition both testify to something elusive that distinguishes between a voluntary matter and a compulsory one, and the existence of which is certain. But we are not at fault if we cannot define it.
Secondly: We say that if inclination (mayalān) is something existent, as the Ash‘ari’s claim, then the disposal of it is a theoretical matter and pertains to man. [That is, switching the inclination from one act to another.] But if inclination is a theoretical matter, as the Maturidis say, its existence (thubūt) and being specified (takhaṣṣuṣ) do not require a necessitating cause (al‑‘illa al-tamma), so an inclination does not necessarily have to be acted upon. [That is, very often no action occurs on the occurrence of an inclination. Thus, there is no compulsion.] Think about this carefully!
In Short: The ḥāṣil bi’l‑maṣdar is dependent, in accordance with the laws of divine practice in the universe, on the maṣdar or source, the basis of which is inclination (mayalān). And neither inclination itself, nor the disposal of it, has [external] existence so that being applied this way or that it should be a contingent being and need an effective agent, or that there should have been preference without something to cause it. Also, neither inclination nor the disposal of it is non‑existent that it should not be amenable to being a condition for the creation of the ḥāṣil bi’l‑maṣdar, or a cause of reward or punishment.
If You Were to Ask: Don’t pre‑eternal knowledge and pre-eternal will pluck out free will and remove it?
You Would Be Told:
Knowledge of a voluntary action does not negate the will. [Because the effective agent is power, not knowledge, which is dependent on what is known.]
Also, pre‑eternal knowledge is all-encompassing like the sky, it is not the beginning of a chain or the starting-point of past time so that effects should be erroneously ascribed to it in disregard of their causes.
Also, knowledge is dependent on the thing known – that is, on how the thing is. Knowledge also encompasses it – so the measure and criteria of the thing known are not based on the principles of divine determining (qadar).
Also, divine will does not look to the cause once and separately to the effect once, rendering the will and the cause ineffective. Indeed, it looks at once to cause and effect.
In consequence, if for example one person kills another with a rifle and we posit the absence of any cause, would the person have died that instant or not?
The Jabriyya say: he would have died even if he had not been killed. For they assert that divine will deals with cause and effect separately, and that there is a disjunction between them.
And the Mu‘tazila say: he would not have died. For according to them, it is permissible that the effect (lit. what is intended) may ‘lag behind’ divine will.
As for the Sunnis, they say: We discontinue [the argument and] are silent. For to assume the absence of any cause necessitates assuming that divine will and knowledge are unconnected with the effect, whereas will and knowledge look to both together. This false assumption necessitates an impossibility.
A Second Introduction
Consider this: the Naturalists say that causes have an actual effect,
the Zoroastrians say that evil has another creator,
and the Mu‘tazila assert that living beings create their [own] voluntary actions. The three are based on a false, deluded idea, are pure error, exceed the mark, and are false analogies that have duped [those people] and led them astray. For proceeding from these assertions they have declared Allah free of anthropomorphic elements (tanzīh), or so they supposed, and have fallen into the trap of associating partners with Him (shirk). If you want to learn the details, listen to the following matters, which also dispel their delusions.
The First:
Man’s hearing, speech, observation, and thought are all particular; he can attend to things only one at a time in succession. Similarly, his aspiration is particular; he can busy himself with things only in turn.
The Second:
Man’s worth is proportionate to what he is. And what he is has value to the extent of his aspiration. And his aspirations are valuable relatively to the importance of the aims to which he devotes himself.
The Third:
Man loses himself in whatever he turns his attention to and gets caught up in it. It is due to this that you see that in their daily lives, people do not ascribe lowly things and insignificant matters to great and lofty persons, but to causes and intermediaries. They suppose that it would be unfitting for their dignity for them to be preoccupied with petty matters and that they would not condescend to such things, or expend their efforts on things of no consequence. Such trivia would be unequal to their vast ambitions.
The Fourth:
It is characteristic of man that when he reflects on something in order to weigh it up, he first of all seeks criteria for it and its relations and principles, in his own self; then in his fellow humans; and if he cannot find them there, in other contingent beings around him. When he ponders over the Necessarily Existent, even, Who in no way resembles contingent beings, his surmising faculty (al‑quwwa al-wāhima) forces him to take the above‑mentioned evil delusion as his principle, and use that deceptive analogy as a telescope. However, the Maker (May His glory be exalted) cannot be observed from this point, for His power cannot be restricted.
The Fifth:
And Allah’s is the highest similitude, His power, knowledge, and will (May His glory be exalted) are like the light of the sun; they embrace everything and encompass all matters. They cannot be restricted or be compared with anything. Just as they look to (ta‘alluq) the vastest things, like the divine throne, so they look to the smallest, like an atom. And just as they create the sun and moon, so they create the eyes of the flea and gnat. And just as they lay down the elevated order of the universe, so they place a fine order in the guts of microscopic organisms. And just as they bind together the celestial bodies and stars, suspended [in space] by that law of His known as gravity, so they order minute particles through a similar law, as infinitesimal samples of them. It is through the intervention of impotence that different degrees occur in power. So all things are equal in the face of the power of the One for whom impotence is impossible. For impotence is the opposite of essential power.
The Sixth:
Divine power looks first (ta‘alluq) to the inner face (malakūtiyya) of things, and this in all things is transparent and beautiful, as discussed. Yes, just as the Most High made the face of the sun burnished and shining and the moon incandescent, so He made the inner face of the night and clouds luminous and beautiful.
The Seventh:
The human mind does not have the breadth and scope to measure divine grandeur (May He be exalted), weigh up [the Most High’s] perfections, or to judge His attributes. This is not possible except in one respect – they may be gauged only from the sum total of His artefacts, and from what is manifested of all His works, and from what may be epitomized from all His acts. Yes, an atom can only be a mirror, not the measure.
If you have understood these matters, know that the Necessary Being (Be He exalted) cannot be compared with contingent beings, for they are as different from one another as are the ground and the Pleiades.
Surely you can see that it was because of this false comparison, that with the Naturalists, the Mu‘tazila, and Zoroastrians their powers of delusive imagination overpowered their reasons, and they ascribed an actual effect to causes, and the creation of acts to living creatures, and the creation of evil to one other than Allah (May He be exalted!). With their delusions and imaginings they asked how with His grandeur, sublimity, and freedom from defect (tanazzuh) Allah (May He be exalted!) would condescend to [create] these base matters and ugly things. To hell with them! How could they shackle the intellect with such a feeble delusion?
But alas! As a whispering doubt, it afflicts believers also. So be careful to avoid it!
Now to Analyze the Words of This Verse and Their Positioning
The fact that has set a seal (khatama) is tied to they will not believe (lā yu’minūn) and follows [immediately] after it is just like making the punishment the consequence of the act, as though it is saying, “Since they have corrupted their wills and not come to believe, they have been punished by having their hearts sealed and blocked up.”
The word(s) has set a seal (khatama) also indicate a compound metaphor (isti‘āra murakkaba), which alludes to parabolic comparisons as a [literary] device (uslūb tamthīlī), which [in turn] signifies an allegory (ḍarb mathal) depicting their misguidance, for what it means is the truth being prevented from penetrating to the heart.
The term ‘seal or sealing’ (al‑khatm) portrays the heart as a house built by Allah (May He be exalted!) to be a treasury full of jewels. But due to the misuse of the will, it has become corrupted and has putrified, and what it contains has turned poisonous so it has been locked up and sealed, to make it shunned.
The word Allāh: Know that the use of [the proper noun instead of the first person pronoun] signifies a turning (iltifāt) from the first to the third persons. This comprises a subtle point pertaining to the intended (bi’n‑niyya) relationship of the word Billāh with they will not believe (lā yu’minūna);
I mean that the implied “in Allah” indicates the following subtle meaning: when the light of the knowledge of Allah came to them, they did not open the door of their hearts to it, so He turned away from them angrily and locked the door on them.
The use of on (‘alā) with the transitive verb khatama suggests that the verb includes the meaning of branding, as though it is saying: Allah has set a seal on their hearts, branding and marking them so the angels see them.
On (‘alā) also suggests that it is the heart’s lofty door that is blocked up, not its lowly door that looks onto this world.
The word their hearts (qulūbihim) precedes hearing and sight because it is the seat of belief; and because the first evidences of the Maker are manifested from the heart’s consultation with itself, and from the conscience referring to the innate disposition. For when a person consults himself, he feels an acute sense of powerlessness that drives him to seek out a point of support, and he perceives his clamouring need to fulfil his hopes and is compelled to find a source of assistance. But there is no support to be found and no help except in belief.
What is meant by the heart is the dominical subtle faculty – not the piece of flesh shaped like a pine‑cone – the emotions of which are manifested in the conscience and the thoughts of which are reflected in the mind. The term heart indicates that the dominical subtle faculty is to man’s spiritual dimensions what the cone-shaped piece of flesh is to the body.
For just as the physical heart is a life‑machine that pumps the water of life to all the parts of the body, and if it is obstructed or ceases from activity, [life departs and] the body stiffens; so the subtle inner faculty dispenses the light of true life to all the parts of the corpus composed of man’s spiritual aspects, and his [mental] states, and hopes. And if, God forbid, the light of belief fades away, his being, with which he contends with the universe, becomes like a motionless spectre, dark in its entirety.
And on their hearing (wa ‘alā sam‘ihim): The repetition of on (‘alā) indicates that the evidences of each [faculty] are independent,
for the heart [points to Allah] with the evidences of the intellect and conscience, and the hearing [points to Him] with evidences from the Qur’an and Hadith (naqlī) and from the outside world. Its repetition also hints that the sealing up of the hearing is not of the same kind as the sealing up of the heart.
Moreover, the singular case of “hearing” despite having a plural on either side of it [that is, the heart and the eyes] is an instance of conciseness, and also contains several signs: it hints that as a verbal noun, [the act of] hearing (sam‘) [is performed with the ear, which] has no cover [like an eyelid]; and that the one making hear (musmi‘) is singular; and that what is heard (masmū‘) by each person is singular; and that a person hears one thing at a time. And it hints at the partnership of all who hear, as though their ears are united becoming one; and at the union of the community and its personification, which makes one imagine that its faculty of hearing is singular; and that one person hearing something suffices the community. It was on account of these points that eloquence required “hearing” to be in the singular. However, the things pertaining to the heart and eyes are different, and their ways are diverse, and their evidences differ, and they receive instruction from different things, and the things that prompt them are various. For these reasons the singular intervenes between two plurals.
The heart is followed by hearing because hearing forms the heart’s character [that is, mostly information reaches the heart through the channel of the ear], and it is closer to it. Also, the hearing resembles the heart in that it receives information from the six directions, [from all sides, while the eyes only look to the front].
And on their eyes is a veil (wa ‘alā abṣārihim ghishāwa): Know that the change of style, that is, the choice of a nominal sentence, indicates that in distinction to the gardens of the hearing and heart, which are continuously renewed, the gardens of the eyes, from which they gather up evidences, are fixed and constant.
By ascribing the sealing up of the heart to Allah (May He be exalted!) and not the veiling of the eyes, it suggests that the sealing up is punishment for what they have earned, while the veiling is of their own doing. It is also a sign that initially in respect of the heart and hearing there is choice, while in respect of the sight there is compulsion; that is, there is choice only to the extent of shutting one’s eyes.
The term veil (ghishāwa) indicates that the eyes look in only one direction.
And the use of the indefinite is to show this; that is, the cause of blindness is not known that it might be avoided.
The precedence of and on their eyes (wa ‘alā abṣārihim) is to direct attention to their eyes, for the eyes mirror the secrets of the heart.
Great is the penalty they incur (wa la‑hum ‘adhābun ‘aẓīm):
Know that just as the verse alludes with this phrase to the bitter fruits in this world of the accursed tree of unbelief; so it indicates the bitter fruit of that side of it that extends to the hereafter, which is the Zaqqum tree of Hell.
Also, the style here requires a phrase like theirs will be a terrible chastisement (wa ‘alayhim ‘iqābun shadīd). For in substituting words fitting for bounties, that is, la‑hum for ‘alayhim, and ‘adhāb for ‘iqāb, and ‘aẓīm for shadīd is a sign that it is a sort of insinuating, condemnatory mockery as though [the Qur’an] is saying: “Their benefit, their delight, their supreme bounty will be nothing but torment.”
This resembles the saying: “Greetings between them will be a painful blow,” and the verse announce to them (lit. the glad tidings of – fa‑bashshirhim) a grievous penalty.
For the la‑ of la‑hum – (lit.) to them denotes the consequences of the action and its benefits, as though it is reading out to them [mockingly]: “Receive the wages for what you have done!”
In the word penalty (‘adhāb) [the root of which also bears meanings of sweet, pleasant, etc.] is an obscure allusion reminding them that they sought pleasure and delight in this world through sinful acts, as though announcing to them: “Now taste the bitter [fruits] of your sweet life!”
And in the word great (‘aẓīm) is a hidden sign reminding them of the state of [the people of] Paradise who receive stupendous bounties, as though it is whispering to them: “See the vast bounties you have forfeited and how you have fallen into grievous suffering.
Great (‘aẓīm) also strengthens the tanwīn (indefiniteness) of penalty (‘adhāb).
If You Were to Ask: The sin of unbelief persists a short time but its punishment is eternal and unending; how is this conformable with divine justice? And if one does accept this, how is it consistent with pre‑eternal wisdom? And if one accepts this even, how does dominical compassion permit it?
You Would Be Told: If one accepts that the penalty is infinite, it is established that unbelief perpetrated in finite time is in six respects a crime of infinite proportions:
Firstly: The person who dies an unbeliever will remain as such even if he lives to all eternity, for he has corrupted the very substance of his spirit. And his corrupted heart has the propensity to commit infinite crimes.
Secondly: Even if unbelief occurs in finite time, it is an infinite crime and gives the lie to infinity, I mean, it denies the whole universe, which testifies to divine unity.
Thirdly: Unbelief is ingratitude for infinite bounties.
Fourthly: Unbelief is a crime against infinity; that is, the divine essence and attributes.
Fifthly: As [indicated by] the Hadith: “The heavens and earth contain me not, yet I am contained in the heart of the believer,” the human conscience is in regard to its outer face limited and finite, but by virtue of its reality the roots of its inner face spread and extend to eternity. In this respect therefore it is infinite. Unbelief however sullies it and it dwindles away.
Sixthly: Although opposites stubbornly resist each other, they are similar in many instances. Thus, on the one hand belief yields the fruits of the delights of Paradise, and on the other unbelief produces everlasting suffering and pain.
It may be concluded therefore if one puts these six aspects together that infinite punishment fits the infinite crime and is pure justice.
If You Were to Ask: So it is conformable with justice, but what about wisdom, which is exempt from creating evils that result in punishment?
You Would Be Told: As you have heard before, a greater good should not be abandoned due to the interspersion of lesser evil, for that would be a greater evil. This is because divine wisdom necessitates the existence of relative truths, which are far more numerous that actual truths; and their appearance is possible only through the existence of evil; and evil can be held within its limits and prevented from its aggression only through intimidation; and intimidation only truly affects the conscience if it [can be] verified and actualized by the existence of external torment; for like the intellect and imagination, the conscience is truly affected by intimidation only if it perceives from various indications the eternal, external reality of torment. It is pure wisdom therefore after filling people with fear at Hell‑fire in this world, for it to exist in the next.
If You Were to Ask: So it is consistent with divine wisdom also, but how does compassion permit it?
You Would Be Told: The unbelievers can be thought of only in terms of non‑existence or existence in torment. If you think it over in your conscience [you will understand that] existence, even if in Hell, is a mercy and better than non-existence. For if you analyze it carefully [you will see that] non-existence is pure evil; indeed, non-existence is the source of all misfortunes and sins, whereas existence is pure good, even if in Hell.
[The unbelievers] go to Hell and abide there forever as their perpetual abode, but after some time paying the penalty for their actions they grow accustomed to it in a way, even if they do not deserve this, and adapt to it. Also, their punishments are reduced and mitigated in many ways in recompense for their good deeds in this world, as is indicated in some Hadiths. These are instances of mercy for them, although they are not worthy of them.
Furthermore, it is in the nature of man’s spirit, if it knows that the torment eliminates its crimes and sins, to be content with it, to alleviate the burden of shame. It will then acknowledge that the punishment is fair and that it deserves it. Out of its love of justice, it receives pleasure from it even.
There are many honourable people in this world who long for the execution of justice so as to be saved from the shame of their crimes.