this is not necessarily impossible. [That is, since man’s inclinations do not have external existence, they do not require a cause.]
The Eleventh: A being has to be necessary for it to come in to existence; that is, a thing cannot come into existence if its existence is not necessary; its existence becomes necessary only on the conjunction of two wills, universal will and particular will; it then has existence instantaneously. But theoretical things can be preferable (tarajjuh) and specified without reaching the degree of necessity, so this does not necessitate a contingent being coming into existence without an effective agent (mu’aththir).
The Twelfth: The knowledge that a thing exists does not necessitate knowing its nature; and the absence of such knowledge does not necessitate its non-existence. So the inability to define the true nature of will does not contradict its certain existence.
If you have comprehended these principles, listen now to what shall be said: we Sunnis say: O Mu‘tazilites! the bondsman [of Allah] is not creator of the ḥāṣil bi’l-maṣdar; that is, the results of his actions. He is only the masdar or source of his actions. For “there is no effective agent in existence other than Allah.” Divine unity (tawḥīd) necessitates this. Now we say to the Jabriyya: man is not under compulsion for he has (particular) will (juz’ ikhtiyārī), for Allah is All-Wise. Moreover, Allah’s being exempt from all defect necessitates it.
• If you were to ask: Whenever man’s will is dissected, the only thing to appear is predestination (al-jabr)?
You would be told:
Firstly: The conscience and innate disposition both testify to something elusive that distinguishes between a voluntary matter and a compulsory one, and the existence of which is certain. But we are not at fault if we cannot define it.
Secondly: We say that if inclination (mayalān) is something existent, as the Ash‘ari’s claim, then the disposal of it is a theoretical matter and pertains to man. [That is, switching the inclination from one act to another.]1 But if inclination is a theoretical matter, as the Maturidis say, its existence (thubūt) and being specified (takhaṣṣuṣ) do not require a necessitating cause (al-‘illa al-tamma), so an inclination does not necessarily have to be acted upon. [That is, very often no action occurs on the occurrence of an inclination. Thus, there is no compulsion.] Think about this carefully!
Nursi, İşârâtü’l-İ’jaz [Abdülmecid], 85. See also, İşârâtü’l-İ’jaz [Sağlam], 100.